Case Note: Why Plaintiffs Should Learn to Love the Strong-inference Standard for Pleading a Securities Fraud Claim—Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd by Wells, Devona L.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 3 Article 1
2010
Case Note: Why Plaintiffs Should Learn to Love
the Strong-inference Standard for Pleading a
Securities Fraud Claim—Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd
Devona L. Wells
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Wells, Devona L. (2010) "Case Note: Why Plaintiffs Should Learn to Love the Strong-inference Standard for Pleading a Securities
Fraud Claim—Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 36: Iss. 3, Article 1.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss3/1
 
 
1364 
CASE NOTE: WHY PLAINTIFFS SHOULD LEARN TO 
LOVE THE STRONG-INFERENCE STANDARD FOR 
PLEADING A SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIM—TELLABS, 
INC. v. MAKOR ISSUES & RIGHTS, LTD. 
Devona L. Wells† 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1365 
 II. HISTORY ............................................................................... 1367 
A. Congress Heightens the Pleading Standard For Securities 
Fraud Claims .................................................................. 1367 
B. Circuits Disagree on What Makes a Strong Inference of 
Scienter ........................................................................... 1369 
C. Tellabs Shareholders Are Twice Rejected By the Trial 
Court for Not Meeting the Act’s Pleading Standards .......... 1370 
D. The Seventh Circuit Adopts a Reasonable Person Standard 
for Finding a Strong Inference of Scienter .......................... 1371 
 III. THE CASE: TELLABS, INC V. MAKOR ISSUES & RIGHTS, LTD. .. 1373 
A. The Stage is Set For Resolution of a Circuit Split ............... 1373 
B. The Court Requires a Holistic Evaluation ........................ 1374 
C. The Court Requires a Comparative Evaluation of Plausible 
Opposing Inferences......................................................... 1374 
D. Concurrence I: Justice Scalia Proposes a Stronger Strong-
Inference Standard .......................................................... 1376 
E. Concurrence II: Justice Alito Believes Congress Wanted a 
Known Quantity in Its Strong-Inference Standard ............ 1377 
F. Dissent: Justice Stevens Believes the Strong-Inference 
Standard Should Look Like Probable Cause ...................... 1378 
 IV. ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 1379 
A. Tellabs Publicized as a Pro-Defense Victory from a Pro-
 
         † J.D. Candidate 2011, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Communica-
tions, University of Washington.  Thank you to the Law Review staff and editors, 
particularly Ellen M. Ahrens and Molly K. Burke for their thoughtful feedback.  
Special thanks to Professor Gregory M. Duhl for his guidance and to attorney Gregg 
M. Fishbein for suggesting an outstanding topic and providing advice along the way.  
Thank you especially to Paul A. Sand for his encouragement, love, and always 
knowing how to make me laugh (e.g., finals dance 2009). 
1
Wells: Case Note: Why Plaintiffs Should Learn to Love the Strong-inferen
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
 
2010] TELLABS v. MAKOR ISSUES & RIGHTS 1365 
Business Court ................................................................ 1379 
B. Defendants Did Not Score the Win They Sought ................ 1380 
C. Why Tellabs is Good for Plaintiffs ................................... 1382 
D. Plaintiffs Prevail Under New Strong-Inference Standard ... 1384 
 V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1390 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the U.S Supreme Court 
is widely thought to be a pro-business Court that rewards big compa-
nies at the expense of the little guy.1  Tellabs v. Makor set the stage in 
2007 for yet another decision favoring a corporate defendant when 
the Court considered a securities fraud claim brought by shareholders 
against fiber optics equipment maker Tellabs, Inc.2  Instead, the Court 
outlined a pleading standard for plaintiffs that remains tough but 
attainable. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split 
and interpret two words in the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
 
 1. “[T]here is little doubt that the Roberts Court is, broadly speaking, a 
business-friendly Court.”  David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? 
Explaining the Chamber of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1019, 1020 (2009).  The article notes that the Court’s pro-business decisions can be 
attributed more to a skepticism for “litigation as a mode of regulation” rather than “a 
bias in favor of business per se.”  Id. at 1021; see also Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice 
Guy, THE NEW YORKER, May 25, 2009, at 42 (“In every major case since he became the 
nation’s seventeenth Chief Justice, Roberts has sided with the . . . corporate 
defendant over the individual plaintiff.”); Posting of Peter Lattman to the Wall Street 
Journal Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/22/plaintiffs-bar-losing-at-
supremes-winning-one-in-beantown/ (June 22, 2007, 9:16 EST) (“I always thought 
that the Rehnquist court was really quite a good forum for business,” said Maureen 
Mahoney of Latham & Watkins to the [Washington Post].  “But I think we now know 
that the Roberts court is even better.”).  
 2. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).  Tellabs 
began in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District in 2003 and was appealed to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc. (Johnson 
II), 303 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 2004) overruled by Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. 
Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2004).  The case was further appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which remanded it to the Seventh Circuit.  Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308, 
vacating, Makor Issues, 437 F.3d 588.  The Seventh Circuit then remanded the case to 
the district court.  Makor Issues & Rights Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 
2008).  The most recent judgment in the case came from the same U.S. District Court 
in Illinois that granted defendants’ motion to dismiss in 2004.  Makor Issues & Rights 
Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 586 (N.D. Ill. 2009).  Tellabs, Inc., based in Lisle, Ill., 
manufactures equipment used in fiber optic cable networks.  Makor Issues, 513 F.3d at 
706. 
2
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Act of 1995 (the Act), which governs securities fraud pleading.3  These 
two words—“strong inference”—had divided the U.S. Circuit Courts 
of Appeals since the Act’s passage.4  Ultimately, the “strong infe-
rence” language led to division at the Supreme Court, which issued 
an 8–1 opinion that contained two concurrences and a dissent.5  The 
majority held that plaintiffs must demonstrate a cogent inference of 
scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference from the 
defendant.6  In other words, a tie goes to the plaintiff.7  
This note first addresses passage of the Act as the catalyst that 
prompted the Supreme Court to lay out a strong-inference standard 
for securities fraud claims.8  Second, this note explains how the 
Supreme Court arrived at the strong-inference standard and, in doing 
so, attempted to resolve a circuit split.9  Third, this note examines the 
fallout from Tellabs and how plaintiffs can use the standard in their 
favor.10  Finally, this note concludes that even though the Supreme 
Court upheld a heightened pleading standard for securities fraud 
plaintiffs, it “dropped the bar as low as it could without eviscerating 
the [Act].”11 
 
 3. In 2005, the Court considered parts of the Act related to loss causation in 
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo.  Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005); 3C 
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW 
§ 16:64 (2d ed. 2009).  But Tellabs v. Makor was the Court’s first look at the strong 
inference standard adopted in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 3, at § 16:64; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1995). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1995). 
 5. The majority opinion was written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined 
by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. 
Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Stephen G. Breyer.  Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308.  Separate 
concurrences came from Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel A. Alito, Jr.  Id. at 329, 
333.  Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.  Id. at 335. 
 6. Id. at 324.  In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court defined scienter 
as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”  425 U.S. 
185, 193 n.12 (1976). 
 7. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 254 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A] tie 
favors the plaintiff.”); N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC, Inc., 
537 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[W]here there are equally strong inferences for and 
against scienter, Tellabs now awards the draw to the plaintiff.”) (quoting ACA Fin. 
Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 59 (2008) (citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324)); see 
also Brett Deforest Maxfield, Ethics, Politics and Securities Law: How Unethical People Are 
Using Politics to Undermine the Integrity of our Courts and Financial Markets, 35 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 243, 286 (2009) (asserting that the Seventh Circuit misinterpreted the Court’s 
strong inference standard, which requires giving “the tie to the plaintiff,” in 
Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. Christopher J. Keller & Michael W. Stocker, Tellabs: PSLRA Pleading Test 
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II. HISTORY 
A. Congress Heightens the Pleading Standard for Securities Fraud Claims 
Without the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Tellabs 
would not exist.12  Congress passed the Act in 1995, three days before 
Christmas, in a vote that overrode the veto of President Bill Clinton.13  
Proponents of the legislation argued that it would ease the burden on 
companies overwhelmed by class actions.14  Critics claimed that, if 
passed, the Act would shield those who engage in securities fraud 
from legitimate lawsuits.15 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must 
contain a short and plain statement of the claim alleging why the 
plaintiff is entitled to relief.16  Securities fraud lawsuits before passage 
of the Act already were subjected to additional pleading requirements 
 
Comparative, Not Absolute, 238 N.Y. L. J. 4 (2007); see also infra Part V. 
 12. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (“As a check 
against abusive litigation in private securities fraud actions, the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) includes exact pleading requirements.”). 
 13. H.R. DOC. NO. 104-150 (1995).  The Act was the first comprehensive revision 
of national securities laws since they were enacted sixty years earlier.  Erin E. 
Rhinehart, Column, Diluting the Strong Inference Standard, 55 FED. LAW., 20, 20 (May 
2008).  The veto override was the first of the Clinton administration.  Joshua Mills, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1995, at Diary 3.  In his veto message to Congress, President 
Clinton stated that he was not willing to sign a bill that would close “the courthouse 
door on investors who have legitimate claims.” H.R. DOC. NO. 104-150, at 1 (1995).  
He gave three reasons for issuing the veto, the first of which addressed the bill’s 
strengthening of the pleading standard for securities fraud claims.  Id.  President 
Clinton wrote that fraud victims should have judicial recourse, which the bill would 
remove.  Id.  He worried that the new heightened pleading standard would erect a 
barrier “so high that even the most aggrieved investors with the most painful losses 
may get tossed out of court before they have a chance to prove their case.”  Id.  The 
House voted 319-100 to override the veto, followed by the Senate, which voted 68-30.  
MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 3 (2004), 
http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98-147.pdf. 
 14. 141 CONG. REC. 19,146 (1995) (statement of Sen. D’Amato).  “The system no 
longer recovers damages for investors who are actually wronged and it unfairly 
focuses the enormous costs of litigation on reputable public companies and not upon 
those who engage in fraud.”  Id.; see also Patrick Berarducci & Larry J. Obhof, Supreme 
Court Clarifies Scienter Pleadings, 17 BUS. L. TODAY 10, 10 (2007) (asserting that private 
securities litigation play an important role in deterring fraud but too many pre-Act 
actions frustrated business activities and imposed a burdensome discovery process, 
which led to settlement if even meritless cases survived a motion to dismiss). 
 15. 141 CONG. REC. 19,146 (1995) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).  Senator Paul 
Sarbanes stated that the bill’s major provisions would go “well beyond curbing 
frivolous lawsuits and will work to shield some of the most egregious wrongdoers from 
legitimate lawsuits brought by defrauded investors.” Id. 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
4
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under Rule 9(b), which requires that pleadings state fraud allegations 
with factual particularity.17 
According to some in Congress, Rule 9(b)’s additional pleading 
requirements did not do enough to prevent private litigants from 
abusing securities laws.18  Therefore, the Act heightened the threshold 
pleading rules for a federal securities fraud claim initiated under 
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC 
Rule 10b-5.19  The Act requires that such a complaint (1) state facts 
with particularity and (2) state facts that give rise to a strong inference 
of scienter.20 
Tellabs originated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, which noted that Congress enacted the Act’s heigh-
tened pleading standard to limit meritless lawsuits and to create a 
uniform pleading standard.21  While Congress succeeded in the 
enactment of a more stringent pleading standard, it failed to create a 
 
 17. In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002); 
see FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  
 18. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 580, 600 (2006) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-369 at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 740). 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to use or employ, in connection with 
the sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors. 
Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.  
Id. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).  As was the case before the Act, plaintiffs still 
must meet the Federal Rule 9(b) requirements.  Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc. (Johnson II), 
303 F. Supp. 2d 941, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting that securities fraud allegations must 
meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements, as well as the Act’s additional 
pleading requirements); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 21. Johnson II, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 952 (quoting Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic 
Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 
(1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740)). 
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uniform pleading standard among the circuits.22 
B. Circuits Disagree on What Makes a Strong Inference of Scienter 
Lacking a definition of strong inference from Congress, the cir-
cuits diverged in their application of the Act’s heightened pleading 
standard.23  On one end of the spectrum, the Seventh Circuit applied 
a reasonable person standard that allowed a plaintiff to survive a 
motion to dismiss “if it alleges facts from which, if true, a reasonable 
person could infer that the defendant acted with the required 
intent.”24  On the other end of the spectrum, the First, Fourth, Sixth, 
and Ninth circuits required a direct comparison of plausible infe-
rences and would find a strong inference if the plaintiff’s allegation 
was the most plausible.25   
In the middle sat the Eighth and Tenth circuits, which consi-
dered all inferences, both of a culpable and innocent state of mind, to 
test if the culpable inference was a strong inference.26  The Second 
and Third circuits also were near the spectrum’s midpoint, employing 
tests that equated a plaintiff’s allegations of either motive and 
opportunity or knowing or reckless conduct with a strong inference.27 
 
 22. Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 601 (noting three different approaches among the 
courts of appeals in finding that a plaintiff demonstrated a strong inference of 
scienter). 
 23. See infra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 24. Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 602. 
 25. Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 345–46 (holding that all allegations should be 
examined to determine if they collectively establish a strong inference of scienter); In 
re Cabletron Sys., 311 F.3d 11, 40 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Each individual fact . . . may 
provide only a brushstroke, but the resulting portrait satisfies the requirement for a 
strong inference of scienter under the PSLRA.”); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 
893, 897 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that courts should consider all allegations and their 
inferences in concluding whether the plaintiff has pleaded the requisite scienter 
inference); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ‘strong 
inference’ requirement means that plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of 
competing inferences.”); see also Maxfield, supra note 7, at 282. 
 26. Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (“If a plaintiff 
pleads facts with particularity that, in the overall context of the pleadings, including 
potentially negative inferences, give rise to a strong inference of scienter, the scienter 
requirement of the Reform Act is satisfied.”); In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 
881, 889 n.6 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting Sixth Circuit’s “most plausible” pleading 
standard); see also Maxfield, supra note 7, at 282. 
 27. Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that the 
circuit’s pre-Act pleading standard survived the Act); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 
180 F.3d 525, 535–36 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs may plead scienter by 
alleging a motive and opportunity to commit fraud or through evidence of reckless or 
6
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C. Tellabs Shareholders Are Twice Rejected By the Trial Court for Not 
Meeting the Act’s Pleading Standards 
On December 11, 2000, Tellabs, Inc. pitched the promise of its 
newest product to shareholders and analysts while selling the strength 
of its established product.28  In the following months, CEO Richard 
Notebaert painted a rosy picture for analysts and shareholders of 
customer demand and sales growth.29  Meanwhile, the company 
reduced sales projections for the first quarter of 2001 and again for 
the second quarter.30  On June 19, 2001, the company announced that 
second quarter sales had plummeted.31  The next day, the stock closed 
at $16.04 per share, far below a high just months earlier of $67.13.32 
On December 3, 2002, Tellabs investors filed a putative class ac-
tion against Tellabs and ten executives, including Notebaert, alleging 
a scheme to deceive and defraud investors as to the true value of the 
company’s stock.33  The lawsuit set the stage for years of still-pending 
litigation and for the Supreme Court to resolve an unsettled facet of 
securities fraud pleading.34 
 
conscious behavior) (quotation and citation omitted); see also Maxfield, supra note 7, 
at 282. 
 28. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 586, 591 (N.D. Ill. 
2009).  The class period began Dec. 11, 2000, and ended June 19, 2001.  Id. at 591.  
Sales of the Titan 5500, despite being described as the company’s “best seller,” 
substantially slowed with excess stored in warehouses.  Id. at 592.  By the start of the 
class period, the Titan 5500 (a digital cross-connect product) was not well received 
because it was inferior to competitors’ offerings.  Complaint of Plaintiff-Appellee, 
Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc. (Johnson I), 262 F. Supp. 2d 937 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (No. 02-CV-
4356).  Meanwhile, the new product, the Titan 6500, was not selling, was behind 
schedule, and failed customer lab evaluations.  Makor Issues, 256 F.R.D. at 591–92. 
 29. In February 2001, Notebaert issued a letter to stockholders describing 
“robust” demand for the Titan 5500, including accelerating growth and that 
“customers are embracing” the Titan 6500. Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc. (Johnson II), 303 
F. Supp.2d 941, 948 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (citing Complaint of Plaintiff at ¶¶ 90–91, Johnson 
I, 262 F. Supp. 2d 937 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (No. 02-CV-4356)).  Less than a month later, 
the numbers began to reveal another story as Tellabs decreased its revenue and 
earnings-per-share expectations for the first quarter while maintaining that demand 
for the Titan 6500 continued to grow.  Id. 
 30. Johnson II, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 948–49. 
 31. Id. at 949–50. 
 32. Makor Issues, 256 F.R.D. at 593 (noting that the $67.13 share price was the 
highest purchased by shareholders during the nearly eight-month class period). 
 33. Johnson II, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 944. 
 34. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  In February 2009, Judge Amy J. St. 
Eve certified the class, allowing plaintiffs to continue moving forward with their 
securities fraud claims. Makor Issues, 256 F.R.D. at 586. 
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The plaintiffs’ allegations were brought under section 10(b) of 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.35  On May 
19, 2003, the district court dismissed the shareholder complaint on 
multiple grounds, including a lack of specificity in the plaintiffs’ 
allegations and a failure to properly allege scienter.36 
The shareholders then amended their complaint, identifying 
twenty-seven confidential sources to further support their securities 
fraud allegations.37  On February 19, 2004, the district court again 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, this time with prejudice.38  The court 
concluded that even though shareholders had sufficiently pleaded 
numerous allegations with specificity as required by the Act, the 
allegations did not support a strong inference of scienter.39  The 
plaintiffs then appealed to the Seventh Circuit, alleging that the 
district court erred on three issues, including whether the complaint 
pleaded a strong inference of scienter.40 
D. The Seventh Circuit Adopts a Reasonable Person Standard for Finding 
a Strong Inference of Scienter 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. presented the Seventh 
Circuit its first opportunity to address the Act’s heightened pleading 
requirement.41  In doing so, the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial 
court in relevant part.42  Like the district court, the Seventh Circuit 
found that the plaintiffs had pleaded securities fraud allegations with 
sufficient particularity, satisfying the first of the two elements of the 
Act’s heightened pleading standard.43  However, in writing for the 
 
 35. Johnson I, 262 F. Supp. 2d 937, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 36. Id. at 937 (concluding also that plaintiffs’ “claims regarding future success 
were nonactionable puffery” and that “revenue projections were covered by safe 
harbor provision”). 
 37. Johnson II, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 945. 
 38. Id. at 970. 
 39. Id. at 960–61. 
 40. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. & Tellabs Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 
2006).  Plaintiffs also argued that the court dismissed as puffery statements that were 
legally actionable and that Tellabs, Inc. could not rely on the Act’s safe harbor 
provision.  Id. 
 41. Id. at 591. 
 42. Id.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss 
allegations against another Tellabs executive, which is not relevant to the heightened 
pleading standard issue.  Id. at 605. 
 43. Id. at 599–600.  The Seventh Circuit also agreed with the district court that 
some statements by Notebaert, such as “we feel very, very good about the robust 
growth we’re experiencing,” amounted to no more than puffery.  Id. at 597.  Mere 
8
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Seventh Circuit, Judge Harlington Wood, Jr. noted that whether the 
plaintiffs adequately alleged scienter is the “even more arduous[] 
hurdle” presented by the Act’s pleading requirements.44  Additionally, 
Judge Wood acknowledged that it was this strong-inference standard 
that had generated a split among the circuits.45  He wrote that most of 
the disagreement centered on the level of factual detail needed in a 
pleading to create a strong inference of scienter.46  Judge Wood also 
lamented that Congress, in creating the strong-inference standard, 
“did not, unfortunately, throw much light on what facts will suffice to 
create such an inference.”47 
In reversing the district court’s order to dismiss the lawsuit, the 
Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that 
Notebaert acted with the requisite state of mind.48  Therefore, the 
plaintiffs were found to have met the Act’s strong-inference standard 
in their allegations against Notebaert and Tellabs.49  The Seventh 
Circuit held that a complaint survives if it pleads facts from which “a 
reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the 
required intent.”50 
In its holding, the Seventh Circuit rejected interpretations of the 
Act’s strong-inference pleading standard by the Second, Third, Sixth, 
 
sales puffery is not actionable under Rule 10b-5.  Id. at 596 (quoting Eisenstadt v. 
Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted)). 
 44. Id. at 600. 
 45. Id. at 595. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 601. 
 48. Id. at 603.  The Seventh Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s definition of 
scienter, which called for a plaintiff to allege facts that “create a strong inference of 
‘deliberate or conscious recklessness’ or a ‘degree of recklessness that strongly 
suggests actual intent.’”  Id. at 600 (quoting In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 
970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999)).  The Seventh Circuit stated that if Congress had wanted to 
impose a more stringent scienter standard it would have done so explicitly, as it did 
when changing the pleading requirements.  Id.  The court, therefore, applied the 
same scienter standard as it did prior to the Act: “an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care, [] which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers 
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been 
aware of it.”  Id. (citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 
(7th Cir. 1977) (internal quotation removed)). 
 49. Id. at 603 (concluding that Notebaert’s statements were actionable against 
Tellabs because, as CEO, “his alleged knowledge of the falsity of his statements can be 
imputed to . . . Tellabs”).  
 50. Id. at 602. 
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Ninth, and Eleventh circuits.51  On January 5, 2007, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.52 
III. THE CASE: TELLABS, INC V. MAKOR ISSUES & RIGHTS, LTD. 
A. The Stage is Set For Resolution of a Circuit Split 
The Supreme Court stated that it granted certiorari to “resolve 
the disagreement among the Circuits on whether, and to what extent, 
a court must consider competing inferences in determining whether a 
securities fraud complaint gives rise to a ‘strong inference’ of 
scienter.”53  In its 8–1 opinion, the Court laid out two requirements 
for a complaint to satisfy the Act’s strong-inference standard and, 
therefore, survive a motion to dismiss.54  First, the Court held that all 
facts alleged must be evaluated holistically and not in isolation.55  
Second, a court evaluating allegations under section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 must take into 
account plausible opposing inferences as part of a comparative 
inquiry to determine if the facts pleaded give rise to a strong infe-
rence.56   
The Supreme Court remanded Tellabs to the Seventh Circuit for 
a reexamination of the case in accordance with the Court’s construc-
 
 51. Id. at 601–02.  Judge Wood observed that the Second and Third circuits 
operated as if Congress had adopted their pre-Act pleading standards, which required 
plaintiffs to plead “either motive and opportunity or strong circumstantial evidence 
of recklessness or conscious misbehavior.”  Id. at 601 (citing Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 
300, 309–10 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 530–35 (3d 
Cir. 1999)).  The Ninth and Eleventh circuits “opted for a more onerous burden,” 
rejected the approach of the Second and Third circuits, and believed that Congress 
intended a stricter standard in its aim to curb abusive securities litigation.  Id. at 601 
(citing In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999); Bryant v. 
Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)).  The Seventh Circuit 
aligned itself with the remaining six circuits, a position that was characterized as a 
“middle ground” because Congress did not adopt or reject particular methods of 
pleading.  Id. (citing Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345 
(4th Cir. 2003); accord Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 
659–60 (8th Cir. 2001); Nathenson v. Zonagon, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 411–12 (5th Cir. 
2001); City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261–63 (10th Cir. 2001); Helwig 
v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550–52 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Greebel v. FTP 
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195–97 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 52. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 549 U.S. 1105 (2007). 
 53. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 317–18 (2007). 
 54. Id. at 322–23. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 323. 
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tion of the Act’s strong-inference standard.57 
B. The Court Requires a Holistic Evaluation 
The Court emphasized that the evaluation of a motion to dismiss 
a securities fraud complaint begins with a “holistic” inquiry.58  Such 
an inquiry must take into account all facts rather than examining 
whether each individual allegation satisfies the strong-inference 
standard.59  The Court stated that the key question is: “When the 
allegations are accepted as true and taken collectively, would a 
reasonable person deem the inference of scienter at least as strong as 
any opposing inference?” 60 
C. The Court Requires a Comparative Evaluation of Plausible Opposing 
Inferences 
To begin laying out its comparative evaluation requirement the 
Court turned to the American Heritage and Oxford English dictiona-
ries to define “strong.”61  The Court determined that when Congress 
adopted the strong-inference requirement in the Act, it equated a 
strong inference with “a powerful or cogent inference.”62  But the 
strength of an inference is not merely its power or potency as it stands 
 
 57. Id. at 329.  The Seventh Circuit was directed by the Supreme Court “to 
dismiss the complaint unless ‘a reasonable person would deem the inference of 
scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw 
from the facts alleged.’”  Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 705 
(2008) (citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323 (footnote omitted)).  On remand from the 
Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit held that the investors’ complaint met the new 
strong-inference standard for scienter by “pleading scienter in conformity with the 
requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.”  Id. 
 58. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326 (citing Id. at 323–24; Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. 
Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 59. Id. at 326 (citing id. at 323–24; Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 601 (holding that, 
given the lack of congressional direction on how to evaluate a strong inference 
pleaded under the Act, the best approach is to examine the allegations and decide 
collectively if they establish a strong inference)). 
 60. Id. at 326. 
 61. Id. at 323 (citing AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1717 (4th ed. 2000); 16 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 949 (2d ed. 1989)).  The American Heritage Dictionary defined 
“strong” as “[p]ersuasive, effective and cogent,” while the Oxford English Dictionary 
defined “strong” as “[p]owerful to demonstrate or convince.”  Id. at 323.  The Oxford 
English Dictionary defined “inference” as “a conclusion [drawn] from known or 
assumed facts or statements”; “reasoning from something known or assumed to 
something else which follows from it.”  Id. (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY). 
 62. Id. at 323. 
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on its own.63  The Court reasoned that the strength of such an 
inference is drawn from opposing inferences and “must be more than 
merely ‘reasonable’ or ‘permissible’—it must be cogent and compel-
ling, thus strong in light of other explanations.”64 
Therefore, the comparative evaluation of plausible opposing in-
ferences is essential to determining whether a plaintiff’s complaint 
gives rise to a strong inference of scienter.65  To determine if a 
securities fraud complaint raises a strong inference, the Tellabs 
majority held that competing inferences must be considered.66  The 
Supreme Court stated that such a comparative evaluation includes 
inferences from the plaintiff, as well as competing inferences drawn 
from the facts alleged.67  The Court reasoned that because the 
strength of such competing inferences cannot be evaluated in a 
vacuum, the inquiry is inherently comparative.68  The question to be 
asked is: “How likely is it that one conclusion, as compared to others, 
follows from the underlying facts?”69 
Writing for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that 
the Seventh Circuit declined to conduct a comparative inquiry and 
instead opted to apply a reasonable person standard.70  The majority 
reasoned that Congress required plaintiffs to plead with particularity 
facts that give rise to a strong inference, which can only be deter-
mined by weighing the plaintiff’s inferences against the defendant’s.71  
The Court ruled that a complaint will survive when a reasonable 
person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as 
 
 63. Id. at 323–24. 
 64. Id. at 324. 
 65. Id. at 323–24. 
 66. Id. at 328. 
 67. Id. at 314. 
 68. Id. at 323. 
 69. Id. at 323. 
 70. Id.  The majority discounted Seventh Circuit concerns that finding a strong 
inference through a comparative evaluation impinges upon the Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial.  Id. at 326–27.  First, the Court noted that the issue was not raised 
on appeal by plaintiffs.  Id. at 326 n.7.  Second, the Court pointed to other “gatekeep-
ing, judicial determinations” that prevent submission of a claim to a jury without 
violating the Seventh Amendment.  Id. at 327 n.8 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (expert testimony can be excluded based on 
judicial determination of reliability); Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 
321 (1967) (judgment as a matter of law); Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Eng’g Co., 243 U.S. 
273, 278 (1917) (summary judgment)).  Finally, the Court concluded that Congress 
may shape the pleading requirements for private securities fraud claims as it sees fit.  
See id. at 327. 
 71. Id. at 328 
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compelling as any opposing inference.72 
The majority’s insistence on a comparative evaluation that awards 
a tie to the plaintiff sits at the core of the discord between the two 
concurrences and dissent that follow.  
D. Concurrence I: Justice Scalia Proposes a Stronger Strong-Inference 
Standard 
The first concurrence came from Justice Antonin Scalia, who 
agreed with the majority that the Act does not require a strong 
inference be irrefutable.73  But he asserted that the majority’s 
definition went beyond what Congress intended.74  In fact, Justice 
Scalia believed it to be “inconceivable” that Congress meant to give 
plaintiffs the edge in close cases when it enacted the Act’s heightened 
pleading standard.75  Instead, Justice Scalia proposed his own strong-
inference test: “whether an inference of scienter (if any) is more 
plausible than the inference of innocence.”76 
To bolster his point, Justice Scalia employed an example involv-
ing the hypothetical theft of a jade falcon.77  He wrote that should the 
falcon be stolen from a room accessed only by A and B, it could not be 
strongly inferred that B was the thief.78  Justice Scalia concluded that a 
strong possibility that B was responsible did not equate to a strong 
inference that B was responsible, reasoning that to form a strong 
inference one must strongly believe.79 
The majority disagreed with Justice Scalia that it could not be 
strongly inferred that either A or B stole the jade falcon from a room 
populated only by A and B.80  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Ginsburg contended that law enforcement officials, along with the 
 
 72. Id. at 324. 
 73. Id. at 330 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The majority stated that “the inference 
that the defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable, i.e., of the ‘smoking-
gun’ genre.”  Id. at 324. 
 74. See id. at 330 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia asserted that his 
interpretation of the “strong inference” language in the Act was not the only or 
normal reading but “the natural reading of the statute.”  Id. at 331–32. 
 75. Id. at 330 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that he could not “see how an 
inference that is merely ‘at least as compelling as any opposing inference[]’ . . . can 
conceivably be called what the statute here at issue requires: a ‘strong inference’”). 
 77. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. at 329 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 80. Id. at 324 n.5. 
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falcon’s owner, would find the inference of guilt as to B quite 
strong—“certainly strong enough to warrant further investigation.”81  
In defense of its strong-inference standard, the majority turned to the 
famous torts case Summers v. Tice82 to demonstrate that “an inference 
at least as likely as competing inferences can, in some cases, warrant 
recovery.”83  
Justice Scalia countered that any fame bestowed on Summers v. 
Tice is owed to the case sticking “out of the ordinary body of tort law 
like a sore thumb.”84  The case, he stated, represents a relaxation of 
the proof ordinarily required in a negligence action.85  Justice Scalia 
added, “[t]here is no indication that the statute at issue here was 
meant to relax the ordinary rule under which a tie goes to the 
defendant.  To the contrary, it explicitly strengthens that rule by 
extending it to the pleading stage of a case.”86 
E. Concurrence II: Justice Alito Believes Congress Wanted a Known 
Quantity in Its Strong-Inference Standard 
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., in his concurrence, gave a tempered 
endorsement of Justice Scalia’s view while criticizing the majority for 
laying out an unknown standard.87  Justice Alito endorsed the view 
that a strong inference should be one, as Justice Scalia argued, that is 
more likely than not correct as opposed to the majority’s holding that 
the inference of scienter is at least as strong as the inference of no 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2–5 (Cal. 1948) (en banc) (establishing 
doctrine of alternative liability); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL HARM § 28, cmt. f (noting only two jurisdictions have rejected the concept of 
alternative liability since the Second Restatement [of Torts] adopted it: Minnesota 
and Oregon). 
 83. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324 n.5 (citing Summers, 199 P.2d at 2–3 (concluding that 
plaintiff wounded by gunshot could recover from two defendants, even though the 
most he could prove was that each defendant was at least as likely to have injured him 
as the other); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28(b), cmt. f (“Since the publication 
of the Second Restatement in 1965, courts have generally accepted the alternative-
liability principle of [Summers v. Tice, adopted in] § 433B(3), while fleshing out its 
limits.”)).  
 84. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 330 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Summers, 199 P.2d at 3–5 (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 86. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 87. See id. at 333–34 (Alito, J., concurring) (adding that facts not stated by 
plaintiffs with particularity should not be used to determine whether the plaintiff met 
the strong-inference standard). 
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scienter.88  
However, Justice Alito stated that the two approaches amount to 
little practical difference because each offers a binary choice: “either 
the facts give rise to a ‘strong inference’ of scienter or they do not.”89  
Justice Alito favored Justice Scalia’s view because it aligned the Act’s 
pleading standard with the test used at summary judgment and 
judgment as a matter of law, “whereas the Court’s test would intro-
duce a test previously unknown in civil litigation.”90  He concluded 
that it seemed more likely that Congress intended a known quantity.91  
Justice Ginsburg disagreed with Justice Alito that Congress in-
tended to transpose a test from summary judgment and judgment as a 
matter of law to a point much earlier in the litigation process.92  She 
concluded that, given the absence of such a stated intention from 
Congress, it is improbable that courts examining a motion to dismiss a 
securities fraud case are expected to determine whether a genuine 
issue of material fact exists.93 
F.  Dissent: Justice Stevens Believes the Strong-Inference Standard Should 
Look Like Probable Cause  
Justice John Paul Stevens, in his dissent, proposed a third strong-
inference standard, one that mirrors the probable-cause standard and 
that would not require the weighing of opposing inferences.94  While 
calling the majority’s strong-inference standard “a perfectly workable 
definition of the term,” Justice Stevens argued that a probable-cause 
standard would be easier to apply and more consistent with the Act.95 
 
 88. Id. at 333–35 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. at 335 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 90. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
 91. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. at 324 n.5. 
 93. Id. (arguing, additionally, that judgment as a matter of law, as a post-trial 
device, turns on “whether a party has produced evidence ‘legally sufficient’ to warrant 
a jury determination in that party’s favor”). 
 94. Id. at 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that because the Act’s heigh-
tened pleading standard is meant to protect defendants from the costs of discovery 
and trial in unmeritorious cases, the standard can be equated with the probable-cause 
standard, which does not require defendants “to produce their private effects unless 
there is probable cause to believe them guilty of misconduct”). 
 95. Id. at 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[a]s a matter of normal 
English usage” the probable-cause and strong-inference standards share “roughly the 
same” meaning and that a probable cause standard would avoid the “unnecessary 
conclusion” that determining a strong inference requires a comparative evaluation of 
plausible opposing inferences). 
15
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Justice Stevens wrote that an inference can be deemed strong 
without comparing inferences.96  As an example, he stated that a 
confirmed drug dealer carrying a suspicious-looking package from a 
building provides the information necessary to draw a strong 
inference that the person was involved in a drug transaction without 
weighing it against other possibilities.97 
However, not to enlist a comparative evaluation, the majority 
emphasized, would provide no reference from which to judge 
whether a pleading rises to a strong inference of scienter.98  According 
to the majority, “[i]n sum, the reviewing court must ask: When the 
allegations are accepted as true and taken collectively, would a 
reasonable person deem the inference of scienter at least as strong as 
any opposing inference?” 99 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Tellabs Publicized as a Pro-Defense Victory from a Pro-Business Court 
Tellabs carried the potential to drastically alter the securities fraud 
litigation landscape.  Anticipation of the Supreme Court’s decision 
centered on the possibility that leverage could shift at a critical stage 
in litigation because the risk to defendants tends to increase once a 
securities fraud complainant survives a motion to dismiss.100  Imme-
diate reaction to the case revealed that securities defendants liked 
what they saw. 
National media coverage characterized the decision as “another 
setback for investor’s advocates”101 and now “more difficult for 
plaintiffs to sue corporations or win substantial damage awards.”102  
 
 96. Id. at 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 336–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 326 (majority opinion) (citing id. at 323–24; Makor Issues & Rights 
Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Allen Ferrell, The Supreme Court’s 2005-2008 Securities Law Trio: Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Tellabs and Stoneridge, ENGAGE, Oct. 2008, at 32, 34, available at 
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090107_FerrellEngage93.pdf. 
 101. Greg Stohr, Top U.S. Court Tightens Limits on Shareholder Suits, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 21, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=a065gqfBaEMQ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (writing that the 
decision gave “companies a new tool to win early dismissal of shareholder suits and 
avoid the expense of mounting a full-scale defense.”). 
 102. Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Pro-Business Decision Hews to Pattern of 
Roberts Court, WASH. POST, June 22, 2007, at D1 (writing that it had been a “resoun-
16
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Additionally, Tellabs, Inc. and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
applauded the Court’s stance on the strong-inference standard, even 
though the position they championed favored the investor plaintiffs 
on remand.103  
Rather than make it impossible for plaintiffs to succeed in a se-
curities fraud lawsuit, the Court held that plaintiffs simply must show 
an inference of scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference.104  
One commentator, notably underwhelmed by the pro-defense spin, 
stated that Tellabs actually “left relatively little changed in the balance 
of power between defendants and plaintiffs.”105  Another commenta-
tor stated that reports of a pro-defense win “got it all wrong.”106  
Instead, the Supreme Court liberalized the standard of most circuits 
to plead a securities fraud class action.107 
B. Defendants Did Not Score the Win They Sought 
Tellabs may have appeared pro-business when it was not for sever-
al reasons.  First, the Court chose to uphold the “strong inference” 
language as adopted by Congress in the Act rather than strike it 
down.108  However, that the Court’s definition did not eliminate the 
 
dingly successful year before the nation’s highest court” for business, including 
Tellabs, where the Court “made it more difficult for plaintiffs to sue corporations or 
win substantial damage awards.”); see also Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, 
Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at A1 (describing how the decision 
made it more difficult for investors to sue companies, executives, and underwriters 
when they suspect securities fraud or unlawful manipulation); David Milstead, Court 
Hands Investor Advocates a Setback, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 22, 2007 (explaining how 
the Court tightened the limits on shareholder-initiated fraud lawsuits). 
 103. Press Release, Tellabs, Inc., Tellabs Issues Statement on Supreme Court 
Ruling in Tellabs v. Makor (June 21, 2007), available at www.tellabs.com/news/
2007/nr062107.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).  Tellabs general counsel James 
Sheehan provided a statement in the press release that, in part, said, “The Supreme 
Court has . . . appropriately established a strict standard to be applied in sending the 
case back for further review.  We believe that Congress intended such a rigorous 
standard when it enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA).”  Id; see also Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Lauds 
Supreme Court Decision in Securities Fraud Case (June 21, 2007), available at 
www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2007/june/07-111.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 
2010); supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
 105. Ferrell, supra note 100, at 34. 
 106. E. Powell Miller, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Tellabs: The Death Knell for 
Securities Class Actions? Not So Fast, 86 MICH. B. J. 40 (Oct. 2007). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 308 (2007). 
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language adopted by Congress did not equate to a victory for 
corporate defendants.  Second, the Court criticized the Seventh 
Circuit and laid out a standard tougher than what came up from the 
circuit court, which could have contributed to the pro-business 
sentiment. 109  But the Seventh Circuit was thought to employ the 
weakest strong-inference standard of all the circuits.110  Therefore, 
rejecting the weakest of the strong-inference standards did not equate 
to a loss for securities fraud plaintiffs.  Third, the opinion could have 
appeared to be a blow to private plaintiffs because the Seventh Circuit 
characterized the Circuit’s standard as “a middle ground” and an 
adoption of the view of six other circuits when it was actually among 
the lowest of any circuit.111  
In the wake of Tellabs, federal district courts and the circuits took 
immediate note by referring to the decision more than ninety times in 
six months.112  If Tellabs could be classified as a win at all for defen-
dants, it was only a modest one that would likely result in just as many 
cases brought by plaintiffs as before Tellabs.113  On multiple fronts, 
defendants did not score the big win they wanted.114  First, the Court 
neglected to address the arguably more important scienter issue of 
defining scienter itself and what must be proven to establish scien-
ter.115  Additionally, Tellabs reinforced the deference given to a judge’s 
subjective views on the severity of wrongdoing in fraud cases and did 
not, therefore, materially change the way judges handle securities 
fraud cases.116  Finally, the Court did not find what defendants would 
 
 109. Id. at 310. 
 110. Maxfield, supra note 7, at 282 (discussing how the Seventh Circuit’s strong 
inference test, some would argue, provided “an extremely lenient standard.”).   
 111. BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 3, at § 16:64. 
 112. 26A MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 24:52 (2009). 
 113. Dan A. Bailey, The U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Tellabs: Major Victory or Minor 
Benefit for Defendants in Securities Class Actions?, RISKVUE, (July 2007), 
www.riskvue.com/articles/fs/fs0707b.htm. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  While U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals agree that a plaintiff can meet the 
scienter requirement by showing a defendant acted recklessly, they disagree on the 
degree of recklessness required—a question not at issue here.  Id; see also Tellabs v. 
Makor, 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007). 
 116. Bailey, supra note 113; see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL AND SAMUEL WOLFF, 
Securities Fraud Actions and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1C GOING PUBLIC 
AND THE PUBLIC CORP. § 16:18 (noting that the degree of deference maintained for 
judges could prove difficult for defendants post-Tellabs as they must accept plaintiff’s 
well-pled facts and guess at what the court will deem as plausible and more 
compelling than any reasonable inferences drawn from the allegations made by the 
plaintiff). 
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have considered a resounding victory: a pleading standard so high 
that it would discourage plaintiffs from filing lawsuits.117   
Another commentator wrote that in not providing a bright-line 
test in its strong-inference standard the Court’s opinion did “not 
appear to have the stringent dictates necessary to send the death-knell 
to private securities suits.” 118  Tellabs may actually have made it easier 
in certain jurisdictions for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss.119  
In fact, securities class actions likely will cause corporate director and 
officer defendants the same disruption as before Tellabs.120 
C. Why Tellabs is Good for Plaintiffs 
While one commentator stated that Tellabs has resulted in greater 
risk of dismissal, he also recognized that “plaintiffs can take solace in 
the fact that generally, courts accept the interpretation of Tellabs that 
awards a tie to the plaintiff.”121  Since Tellabs, in fact, district courts 
have readily awarded the tie in close cases to plaintiffs.122 
By establishing a comparative standard that takes into account 
the plaintiff’s pleadings as well as the defendant’s, the Supreme Court 
dropped the Act’s strong-inference bar as low as it could without 
eviscerating the standard adopted by Congress.123  Further, the test 
enunciated by Tellabs acknowledged an important role for well-pled 
securities fraud lawsuits.124  By allowing a standard that favors plaintiffs 
 
 117. Bailey, supra note 113. 
 118. VINCENT G. CARACCIOLO, INTEGRO USA, INC., TELLABS: THE SUPREME COURT 
DECISION: HOW HIGH A HURDLE? 2 (2007), http://www.integrogroup.com/portal/
serverpt/AllFiles/tellabs_supreme_court_decision_july_2007.pdf. 
 119. Id. at 1. 
 120. Id. at 2. 
 121. KAUFMAN, supra note 112; see also Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 
228, 254 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A] tie favors the plaintiff.”). 
 122. Akerman v. Arotech Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 372, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“When the competing inferences rest in equipoise, the ‘tie . . . goes to the 
plaintiff.’”) (quoting City of Brockton Ret. Sys. v. Shaw Group Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 
464, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal quotation omitted)); Teamsters Local 617 Pension 
& Welfare Funds v. Apollo Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 763, 792 (D. Ariz. 2009) 
(“[T]he court endorses this tie-breaking approach.”); In re Amaranth Natural Gas 
Commodities Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 513, 543 n.199 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“In other words, 
in close cases, tie goes to the plaintiff.”); Sloman v. Presstek, Inc., No. 06-cv-377-JD, 
2007 WL 2740047, at *7 (D. N.H. 2007) (“[A] tie now goes to the plaintiff.”). 
 123. Keller & Stocker, supra note 11, at 4. 
 124. “Plaintiffs benefitted to the extent Tellabs supports the 10b-5 private right of 
action[,] which has been greatly expanded and restricted by caselaw and legislation.”  
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when the holistic evaluation finds evenly matched inferences, the 
Supreme Court demonstrated an understanding that the Act’s 
heightened pleading standard places plaintiffs at enough of a 
disadvantage by requiring allegations that contain strong inferences 
early in a case and without the benefit of discovery.125 
The Court demonstrated this understanding by acknowledging 
that fraud evidence tends to be subtle and difficult to locate when it 
held that plaintiff’s evidence of fraud at a motion to dismiss need not 
be the equivalent of a smoking gun.126 
The tone of the decision favored plaintiffs, as well.127  For in-
stance, the first sentence of the opinion praised private securities 
litigation as an essential supplement to criminal antifraud prosecu-
tions and civil actions.128  The Court also wrote, “Nothing in the 
PSLRA Act, we have previously noted, casts doubt on the conclusion 
‘that private securities litigation [i]s an indispensable tool with which 
defrauded investors can recover their losses’—a matter crucial to the 
integrity of domestic capital markets.”129 
 
5 ALAN R. BROMBERG AND LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES 
FRAUD § 10:114.20 (2d ed. 2009). 
 125. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006).  The mandated discovery stay results in a 
delay of most discovery until dismissal motions are ruled upon, which “does not give 
plaintiffs access to discovery which might fortify their allegations.”  BROMBERG & 
LOWENFELS, supra note 124; see also, Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class 
Actions Under the Radar, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 816–17 (2009) (asserting that 
the Act’s discovery stay, combined with the tightened pleading standards and a short 
statute of limitations, means that plaintiffs’ attorneys “may lack sufficient time to 
uncover enough evidence to persuade a court that fraud has occurred.”); Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 530 (2009) (noting that the 
requisite stay “puts the plaintiff in a vise: the pleading rules require particularized 
allegations and a strong inference of scienter, while the discovery stay deprives the 
attorney of the conventional means to develop this information”).   
 126. Bailey, supra note 113.  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 
U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (“The inference that the defendant acted with scienter need not 
be irrefutable, i.e., of the ‘smoking-gun’ genre, or even the ‘most plausible of 
competing inferences . . . .’” (quoting Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 
2004) (quoting Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc))). 
 127. Ferrell, supra note 100; see also 5 RICHARD M. PHILLIPS, ET AL., BUSINESS AND 
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 62:45.50 (2d ed.) (noting that while the 
Court rejected the “anomalously pro-plaintiff” strong-inference standard from the 
Seventh Circuit, “the Supreme Court’s holding and other language in the opinion 
suggest a somewhat more plaintiff-friendly view of securities class actions than had 
previously prevailed in many circuits.”). 
 128. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 313. 
 129. Id. at 320 n.4. (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 
547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)).   
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One commentator noted that Supreme Court reforms often 
“swing the pendulum too far and eliminate meritorious cases,” but 
avoided such an outcome in Tellabs.130  In this case, the Supreme 
Court instead moved the pendulum closer to the middle, when it 
imposed a more reasonable burden for plaintiffs to meet and enabled 
plaintiffs to bring meritorious lawsuits.131 
Other commentators argue that Tellabs did even more for securi-
ties plaintiffs.132  One commentator wrote that the Court dropped the 
ball in allowing plaintiffs too much room to maneuver.133  She 
contended that the Court weakened the Act’s heightened pleading 
standard and undercut Congress’s attempt to rein in the significant 
discretion judges must exercise in evaluating securities fraud allega-
tions during a motion to dismiss.134 
Additionally, two commentators wrote that the Court’s strong-
inference standard means that plaintiffs must demonstrate only that 
their allegations of scienter are just as likely as any innocent explana-
tion from defendants, rather than reaching some highly abstract level 
of probability.135  They concluded that such a standard “tilts steeply in 
favor of plaintiffs” because they “can buttress their claims with as 
many documents and witnesses as they please.  In stark contrast, 
defendants under Tellabs may offer competing explanations of 
innocence based only on the plaintiff’s complaint.”136 
D. Plaintiffs Prevail Under New Strong-Inference Standard  
Since Tellabs v. Makor, all U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals except 
the Tenth Circuit have addressed the strong-inference standard in 
light of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act’s heightened 
pleading standard.  The Seventh Circuit was first in the remand of 
Tellabs.137  Judge Richard A. Posner, writing for the circuit, noted, “To 
judges raised on notice pleading, the idea of drawing a ‘strong 
inference’ from factual allegations is mysterious.”138  The Seventh 
 
 130. Miller, supra note 106, at 42. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Keller & Stocker, supra note 11, at 4. 
 133. Rhinehart, supra note 13, at 21. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Keller & Stocker, supra note 11, at 4. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 705 (2008). 
 138. Id. at 705 (“To draw a ‘strong inference’ in favor of the plaintiff might seem 
to imply that the defendant had pleaded facts or presented evidence that would, by 
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Circuit nonetheless proceeded with a careful, thoughtful analysis that 
considered the plaintiff’s allegations against multiple explanations 
from the defendants.139  The circuit court then concluded, “the 
inference of corporate scienter is not only as likely as its opposite, but 
more likely.  And is it cogent?  Well, if there are only two possible 
inferences, and one is much more likely than the other, it must be 
cogent.”140  The Seventh Circuit finding in favor of plaintiffs so soon 
after Tellabs immediately undermined the widespread notion that 
Tellabs was a pro-defense opinion.  In fact, The Wall Street Journal’s Law 
Blog admitted upon release of the Seventh Circuit opinion that Tellabs 
was not as bad as it seemed for plaintiffs after the newspaper had been 
among the early outlets touting Tellabs as pro-defense.141 
Just months later, a decision from the First Circuit provided addi-
tional insight into the potential for plaintiffs who bring post-Tellabs 
securities fraud allegations.142  The circuit court reversed the district 
court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, which was issued 
the same day the Supreme Court released Tellabs.143  Plaintiff share-
holders in Mississippi Public Employees’ v. Boston Scientific alleged that 
Boston Scientific omitted material information when it disclosed 
manufacturing changes to a heart stent that it later recalled.144  Judge 
Sandra L. Lynch noted that the district court granted the motion to 
dismiss under a higher standard than should be imposed under 
Tellabs.145  She wrote, “While there is support for defendants’ infe-
 
comparison with the plaintiff’s allegations, enable a conclusion that the plaintiff had 
the stronger case; and therefore that a judge could not draw a strong inference in the 
plaintiff’s favor before hearing from the defendant.  But comparison is not essential, 
and obviously is not contemplated by the Reform Act, which requires dismissal in 
advance of the defendant’s answer unless the complaint itself gives rise to a strong 
inference of scienter.”). 
 139. Id. at 706–11. 
 140. Id. at 710. 
 141. See Posting of Peter Lattman to the Wall Street Journal Law Blog, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/01/17/7th-cir-revisits-tellabs-a-milberg-weiss-win/ (Jan. 
17, 2008 16:45 EST) (reporting that its initial post-Tellabs headline, “Supremes Deliver 
Another Blow to Plaintiffs Securities Bar,” may not ring as true as it initially appeared); 
Posting of Peter Lattman to the Wall Street Journal Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj
.com/law/2007/06/21/supremes-deliver-another-blow-to-plaintiffs-securities-bar (June 
21, 2007 10:33 EST). 
 142. Miss. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75 (1st 
Cir. 2008). 
 143. Id. at 94. 
 144. Id. at 79–80. 
 145. Id. at 89. 
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rences . . . plaintiff’s inferences are at least as equally strong.”146  The 
reversal in Boston Scientific, alongside the circuit court’s recognition 
that Tellabs lowered the threshold pleading requirement for plaintiffs, 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s strong-inference standard is 
far better for plaintiffs than the pro-business spin predicted.147  As one 
commentator stated, Boston Scientific “highlights that even after Tellabs, 
in certain circumstances, plaintiffs will be able to continue to meet the 
PSLRA’s pleading requirements . . . .” 148 
The Third Circuit has twice found in favor of plaintiffs since Tel-
labs.149  In Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, it reversed the trial 
court’s order granting a motion to dismiss on allegations of false or 
misleading statements regarding earnings growth and pricing.150  The 
circuit court concluded that “the totality of facts alleged by Share-
holders here establishes a strong inference of scienter.”151  The 
opinion also pointed to the importance of a holistic inquiry as part of 
a common-sense view of the allegations.152  The court concluded that 
the fraud allegations gave rise to a strong inference that the defen-
dant at least acted recklessly, enough to survive a motion to dismiss.153 
Additionally, the Third Circuit determined in Alaska Electricians 
Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp. that the district court correctly denied 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.154  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant schemed to mislead The Journal of the American Medical 
Association, as well as the investment community, by submitting 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Kevin M. LaCroix, First Circuit Applying Tellabs, Reverses Securities Case 
Dismissal, THE D&O DIARY, Apr. 17, 2008,  http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/04/
articles/securities-litigation/first-circuit-applying-tellabs-reverses-securities-case-dismissal 
(“This specific statement is an explicit recognition that, in the First Circuit at least, 
the Tellabs standard not only did not advance the defendants’ interests, but it 
arguably aids plaintiffs’ interests by imposing a lower threshold pleading 
requirement.”).  
 148. Id. 
 149. See Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 280 (3d Cir. 
2009) (concluding that defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied because 
fraud allegations by plaintiff showed that the defendant acted consciously or 
recklessly in making false statements); Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., 
554 F.3d 342, 352 (3d Cir. 2009) (determining that the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
was correctly denied by the district court). 
 150. Avaya, 564 F.3d at 280. 
 151. Id. at 269. 
 152. Id. at 273. (“[I]nference is not arithmetic.  The inferential significance of 
any single allegation can be determined only by reference to all other allegations.”). 
 153. Id. at 269. 
 154. 554 F.3d 342, 351 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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incomplete data and using it as a basis for publishing in the national 
journal.155  The court stated that even though the scienter allegations 
were thin, “when examined as a whole . . . the Amended Complaint is 
replete with allegations that defendants acted with the requisite 
scienter.”156  The decision provided an important affirmation that 
even when a court finds “thin” allegations of scienter, it will conduct 
the requisite holistic inquiry and, potentially, find for the plaintiff. 
Avaya also highlighted that not all is harmonious among the U.S. 
Circuit Courts of Appeals in the post-Tellabs world.  The Third Circuit 
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s application of the strong-inference 
test as a misread of the Tellabs standard, asserting that the Ninth 
Circuit has attempted to graft the requisite “holistic analysis onto the 
Ninth Circuit’s earlier jurisprudence as an extra layer.”157  The Ninth 
Circuit revised its pleading standard post-Tellabs to (1) assess whether 
a plaintiff’s individual allegations are sufficient under the Act and (2) 
perform a second holistic analysis to determine if the inference of 
scienter alleged is greater than the sum of its parts.158  The Third 
Circuit argued that the dual-inquiry approach undertaken by the 
Ninth Circuit contradicts the holistic inquiry from Tellabs, which 
“explicitly warrants against scrutiniz[ing] allegations in isolation.”159  
Six months later, the Ninth Circuit stuck with its dual-inquiry 
approach in Siracusano v. Matrixx Initatives, Inc.160  The circuit court 
concluded that allegations that the defendant withheld crucial 
information regarding the popular cold medicine Zicam was at least 
as compelling as any plausible non-culpable explanation.161 
But the Ninth Circuit has admitted that its previous strong-
inference standard was too strong as now viewed under the Tellabs 
lens.162  In 2008, South Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger was remanded to the 
district court to reconsider the Supreme Court’s new scienter 
standard after recognizing that, post-Tellabs, the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Avaya, 564 F.3d at 273 n.46. 
 158. 26A MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION DAMAGES § 24:4 (2009). 
 159. Avaya, 564 F.3d at 273 n.46 (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd. 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007)). 
 160. 585 F.3d 1167, 1180 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the scienter analysis 
requires, first, a determination of whether plaintiff’s allegations alone create a strong 
inference of scienter and, if not, then a holistic review of the same allegations). 
 161. Id. at 1183 (reversing trial court order granting motion to dismiss). 
 162. S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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strong-inference standard was too strong.163  Importantly, the circuit 
court noted that vague allegations must be considered as a part of the 
holistic analysis to determine if a strong inference of scienter exists.164  
On remand, the district court concluded that plaintiffs pleaded a 
strong inference of scienter.165 
Most circuits, however, have turned away plaintiffs for not satisfy-
ing Tellabs’s strong-inference standard.166  For instance, the Eighth 
Circuit’s frequent dismissals of complaints brought by shareholder 
plaintiffs since Tellabs demonstrates that the strong-inference hurdle, 
 
 163. Id. at 786. 
 164. Id. at 784. 
 165. S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, No. C04-1599-JCC, 2009 WL 3153067, at *12 
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 1, 2009); see also In re Syncor Int’l Corp. Sec. Litig., 239 F. App’x 
318, 321 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing grant of motions to dismiss filed by officers and 
directors of a company because the alleged illegal payment scheme “creates a strong 
inference that all three defendants believed the illegal payments were driving 
overseas growth”). 
 166. Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 
200, 208–12 (5th Cir. 2009) (determining that statements that dividend payments 
were “under review,” as well as interval between end of tender offer period and 
increase in dividend did not raise strong inference of scienter); Cozzarelli v. Inspire 
Pharms. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 625 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that an argument dependent 
on stringing together isolated allegations without necessary context fails to satisfy 
strong-inference standard); Mizarro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1249 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (concluding that generalized allegations that corporation orchestrated an 
improper chargeback scheme to inflate earnings and failed to advise investors of its 
effect on earnings did not satisfy strong-inference standard); Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 
F.3d 801, 812 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that accounting improprieties did not 
support strong inference of scienter); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 
540 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that insider trading, access to 
information, and rejection of alternative accounting methods did not give rise to a 
strong inference of scienter); N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen 
IDEC Inc., 537 F.3d 35, 55 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding that plaintiffs failed to raise a 
plausible inference that defendants knew financial projections made and assertions 
related to a combination therapy product were misleading); Teamsters Local 445 
Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(concluding that plaintiffs failed to support allegations of false statements); Pugh v. 
Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 694–95 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that allegations of 
boosting newspaper circulation figures failed to satisfy strong-inference standard for 
relying on fraud by hindsight argument and not supporting allegation of suspicious 
trades); Cornelia I. Crowell GST Trust v. Possis Med., Inc., 519 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 
2008) (determining that receiving unfavorable data regarding medical device before 
disclosing the data did not raise a strong inference of scienter); Winer Family Trust v. 
Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 331–32 (3d Cir. 2007) (concluding a post-press release revised 
cost estimate did not provide evidence needed for strong inference of scienter). 
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even though far from impossible to clear, remains high.167  In 2008, 
the court concluded that multiple allegations, including accusations 
of insider trading and a falsely sworn Sarbanes-Oxley certification, did 
not satisfy the strong-inference standard in In re Ceridian Corp. 
Securities Litigation.168  The court cited Judge Posner’s discomfort with 
the Supreme Court’s newly minted strong-inference standard and 
seemed to commiserate with his hesitation to draw a strong inference 
from factual allegations when the Seventh Circuit recognized “it is an 
inquiry that must be made, however awkward or unusual, because it 
has been mandated by Congress to remedy widespread abuses of the 
Rule 10b-5 class action device.”169 The opinion discounted the 
plaintiff’s argument that the district court did not engage in the 
requisite holistic analysis.170  Judge James B. Loken wrote that simply 
because a court discusses multiple assertions separately does not mean 
they were not analyzed collectively.171  The circuit court then method-
ically turned down each of the plaintiff’s allegations for failing to 
plead a strong inference of scienter.172 
Several recent district court cases, however, should encourage 
plaintiffs navigating the post-Tellabs world.  Courts across the country 
have demonstrated the ability to reason through competing infe-
rences and find for the plaintiff in close cases.173  Such results 
 
 167. Horizon Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. H & R Block, Inc., 580 F.3d 755, 762–63 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (concluding that defendant’s decision to outsource tax staffing, failure to 
maintain tax software, and operating without a chief financial officer for eleven 
months did not raise a strong inference of scienter); Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 
928 (8th Cir. 2008) (concluding that allegations of intentionally false statements 
regarding medical costs that artificially inflated stock price while officers sold 
personal stock holdings did not give rise to strong inference); In re Ceridian Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d 240, 246–49 (8th Cir. 2008) (determining that alleged insider 
trading, approval of accounting policies, allegedly false sworn Sarbanes-Oxley 
certification, and ongoing investigation did support strong inference of scienter); 
Possis Med., 519 F.3d at 784 (concluding that receiving unfavorable data regarding 
medical device before disclosing the data did not raise strong inference).  
 168. 542 F.3d at 247–49. 
 169. Id. at 245; see Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 705 
(7th Cir. 2008); supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 170. In re Ceridian Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d at 246. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. (concluding that alleged insider trading, approval of accounting policies, 
allegedly false sworn Sarbanes-Oxley certification, and ongoing investigation did 
support strong inference of scienter). 
 173. Bacon v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., No. 09-21871-CV-KING, 2010 WL 54753, at *10 
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2010) (concluding that the complaint in its entirety contained 
allegations that “strongly imply” defendants acted with the requisite state of mind); 
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demonstrate that a tie can and does go to the plaintiff. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the less than three years since Tellabs, the ability of plaintiffs to 
bring a securities fraud class action has fared far better than post-
Tellabs publicity predicted.174  
Rather than a pro-defense interpretation, the Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the Act’s strong-inference test preserved the tough 
standard Congress intended while acknowledging the value of 
securities fraud actions.175  Doing so rightfully balanced the interests 
of plaintiffs against those of defendants.  Most importantly, Tellabs 
provided an attainable standard that allows securities fraud lawsuits to 
fulfill their role as vital tools for plaintiffs to bring their causes of 
action and recover their losses.176 
 
 
 
Gosselin v. First Trust Advisors L.P., No. 08-C-5213, 2009 WL 5064295, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 17, 2009) (concluding that plaintiff satisfied the heightened pleading standard); 
Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, No. WMN-06-1892, slip op. 2009 WL 3003247, at *8 
(D. Md. May 1, 2009) (“No doubt this is a close case, but the Court remains 
persuaded that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support an inference of scienter 
at least as compelling as these opposing inferences.”); Mill Bridge V, Inc. v. Benton, 
No. 08-2806, 2009 WL 4639641, at *29 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2009) (concluding that, given 
the totality of circumstances, plaintiff’s final allegation created a strong inference of 
scienter); Jayhawk Capital Mgmt., LLC v. LSB Inds., Inc., No. 08-2561-EFM, 2009 WL 
3766371, at *14 (D. Kan. Nov. 10, 2009) (concluding that plaintiff’s allegation 
supported a fraudulent inference at least as compelling as defendant’s legitimate 
business reason); Middlesex Ret. Sys. v. Quest Software, Inc., No. CV 06-6863, 2008 
WL 7084629, at *5–10 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2008) (concluding that allegations of 
misleading SEC filings were at least as compelling as the inference that defendant was 
merely negligent). 
 174. See infra Part IV.C-D. 
 175. See infra Part IV; see also Kenneth A. Kuwayti & Olga A. Tkachenko, Early 
Inferences from the Supreme Court’s Tellabs Ruling, 23 No. 15 ANDREWS CORP. OFFICERS & 
DIRS. LIAB. LITIG. REP. 13 (2008) (arguing that early cases interpreting Tellabs raised 
the bar on pleading securities fraud, “[b]ut the bar is not so high that it will deter 
legitimate suits from going forward.”). 
 176. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 320 n.4. 
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